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I. Introduction 
 
“[T]he Internet [contains] ‘the largest information database’ in the world.  You 
may find it hard to imagine, the vast resources we have made available to you, to dig up 
information on anybody . . . in a 100% legal and efficient way . . . .  You will be surprised 
as to the information available on anybody including yourself.” 
--advertisement from socialsecurity-numbersearch.com1  
Welcome to the $5 billion-a-year personal data industry,2 a legal wild-west 
frontier where legitimate and illegitimate players collect, aggregate, and exchange large 
amounts of personal data without regulation.3  For example, anyone can click on the 
internet ad referenced above and buy a person’s information including social security 
number for only $34.95.4  In recent years, our increased reliance on electronic 
transactions5 has led to an abundance of digitized personal data,6 greatly fueling the 
industry’s growth.  These transaction histories are often aggregated with other private and 
public sector data to create behavioral profiles, primarily for marketing.7   
                                                
1 Social Security Lookup, http://www.socialsecurity-numbersearch.com/social-security-number-
lookup.htm (last visited February 14, 2006). 
2 Heather Timmons, Security Breach at LexisNexis Now Appears Larger, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at C7. 
3 Jonathan Krim, Pentagon Creating Student Database, WASH. POST., June 23, 20005, at A1. 
4 Social Security Lookup, http://www.socialsecurity-numbersearch.com/social-security-number-
lookup.htm (last visited February 14, 2006). 
5 A Pew research in 2004 found that 83 million people had shopped online, and overall online sale was 
estimated to be $120 billion in 2004. Bob Tedeschi, No Longer a Niche Marketing Outlet, The Internet Is 
Now Attracting Shoppers from Almost All Walks of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at C4.  
6 See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 22-26 (2004) (DoubleClick, a company that profiles people 
online browsing and shopping habits, has already amassed profiles for 80 million U.S. household at the end 
of 1999). 
7 See id. at 16-20. 
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 In 2005, in the midst of increased identity thefts and data security breaches, 
Congress began to tackle the lack of oversight in the data industry,8 and proposed twenty-
two bills addressing identify theft.9  Because there is no comprehensive federal legal 
framework to address data privacy,10 these proposed bills aim shore up holes in a 
patchwork of federal laws that each addresses a narrow area of data privacy.11  For 
example, some federal laws regulate the collection and use of records by federal 
agencies,12 while others regulate access to education records,13 the sale of state 
Departments of Motor Vehicles data,14 and privacy in credit reporting.15    
While it is unclear what privacy legislation Congress will eventually pass, any 
new legislation that restricts the transfer of data will likely face challenges on First 
Amendment grounds.  In recent years, companies that collect and sell personal data, as 
well as corporations that use and share their own customers’ data, have fought regulation 
as a restriction on free speech.16  Courts have just begun to address this First Amendment 
defense, and often classify the collection and exchange of personal data as commercial 
speech.17  Thus, how the courts apply the commercial speech doctrine to the use and sale 
of personal data will directly impact whether the government may regulate in this area.   
                                                
8 See, e.g., Tom Zeller Jr., The Scramble to Protect Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at C1 
(detailing public and congressional reaction to recent breaches at data brokers Choicepoint and 
LexisNexis). 
9 Zeller, supra note 8.   
10 SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 67.  
11 Id. 
12 Privacy Act of 1974.  SOLOVE, supra note 9, at 67-72, provides this listing in more details. 
13 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.  
14 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994. 
15 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003.  H.R. 2622 (108th Cong, 1st Sess.) (2003). 
16 This argument has been raised, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  See 
infra Part III.B for a discussion of the arguments raised in the case.    
17 Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1409 (citing U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1999) and United Reporting Publ'g 
Corp. v. California Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom. u, 120 S. Ct. 
483 (1999) as examples). 
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 This article will outline this emerging area of the commercial speech doctrine, 
analyze the courts’ difficulties in applying the doctrine to data privacy laws, and propose 
a new structural approach to determine the constitutionality of data privacy laws.  Part II 
of this article sets forth the background on privacy issues arising from the use of personal 
data.  Part III outlines two main problems with applying the commercial speech doctrine 
to data privacy laws.  In particular, it discusses the problem of categorizing personal data 
as commercial speech and the problem of determining the proper level of scrutiny to 
evaluate the constitutionality of data privacy regulations.  In light of these problems, Part 
IV proposes a new multi-tiered approach to the commercial speech doctrine for personal 
data speech.  The proposed approach eliminates the difficult inquiry of whether personal 
data is commercial speech.  Instead, under the proposed approach, categorical bans of 
personal data speech will receive strict scrutiny while privacy regulations that aim to 
address the issue of data control will receive intermediate scrutiny.  The proposed 
approach also includes a separate tier for data privacy legislation that provides for private 
rights of action.  
II. Background 
 
A. Personal Data: The Beginning of a New Portable Commodity 
 
In the 1970s, both corporations and government entities began using computer 
databases to store records19 and made data portable for the first time.20  The transition 
from paper to electronic records made it feasible for private parties to obtain data, 
                                                
19 See COMM. ON INNOVATIONS IN COMPUTING AND COMMUNC’NS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A 
REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR COMPUTING RESEARCH 159-64 (1999) [hereinafter Funding a 
Revolution].  
20 Knight Ridder Newspaper, Computers Mine Personal Data, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 6, 2006, at A3. 
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 analyze it, and sell it as a commodity.  Indeed, government databases were the seed 
data sources for many private commercial databases.21   
In the last decade, unprecedented increases in both supply and demand for data 
triggered an explosive growth of the personal data industry.  On the supply side, 
increased internet use led to an explosive growth in the amount of available data.22  For 
example, one data profiler claims they have information on 90 million U.S. households.23  
On the demand side, corporations began utilizing the new data commodity to target 
advertisements to selected customers who would be interested in their products and 
reaped improved returns on their advertising investments.24  The promise of better returns 
led to a huge appetite for consumer data, which in turn fed the growth of the “data 
mining” or “data profiling” industry, a group of companies that “aggregate information 
contained in private databases to create consumer profiles that are then offered for sale to 
interested parties.”25  
Such profiles often include personal information ranging from information in 
public records (e.g. name, social security number, race, gender, and home ownership) to 
habitual information (e.g. shopping habits and utility usage) to private and potentially 
embarrassing information (e.g. arrest records, lifestyle preferences, hobbies, religion, and 
medical information).26  Such information is available for as little as $65 per thousand 
                                                
21 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1156 
(2005). 
22 Bob Tedeschi, supra note 5. 
23 Abacus Alliance Data, http://www.abacusus.com/products_&_services/abacus_alliance_data/default.asp 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005). 
24 SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 17. 
25 Richards, supra note 21, at 1157.  For purpose of this article, the “profiling industry” is treated as a 
segment of the data broker industry.  
26 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy and Consumer Profiling, 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). 
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 names, categorized by the type of consumer sought by marketers.27  For example, the 
profiling company Focus USA boasts on its web site that it has profiling information on 
“virtually every household in the country.”28  Their product offerings include such 
creatively named lists such as “In Style Women,” “Born to Shop,” and “Gardening 
Buffs.”29   
B. “The heart of a surveillance system that will turn society into a transparent world.”  
 
Even as far back as 1974, Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, quoting 
Arthur Miller, noted that the computer has become “the heart of a surveillance system 
that will turn society into a transparent world.”30  In Douglas’ time, George Orwell’s 
novel 1984 depicted a future where “Big Brother” uses computer databases to track every 
member of society.31  Three decades later, due to the availability of personal data, the 
fictional and prophetic fears of surveillance, control, and loss of anonymity have become 
alarmingly real.   
For example, a recent GAO survey indicated 52 federal agencies had or planned 
on having data-mining programs in 2004.32  Both the FBI and the Department of Defense 
have used commercial databases for terrorist surveillance post 9/11.33  The military has 
also tried to contract a marketing firm to create a customized database of teenagers to 
                                                
27 Id. 
28 Focus USA Consumer Lists, http://www.focus-usa-1.com/consumer_lists.html (last visited Nov. 1, 
2005). 
29 Focus USA Microtargeted Lists, http://www.focus-usa-1.com/ microtargeted.html (last visited Nov. 1, 
2005). 
30 Sampson v. Murray, 45 U.S. 61, 96 n. 2 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Arthur Miller, 
“Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview,” 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 
[1972]). 
31 SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 31-35. 
32 Knight Ridder Newspaper, Computers Mine Personal Data, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 6, 2006, at A3. 
33 See Jeffery Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy and Security in an Age of Terror, 46 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 607, 610-611 (2004) (discussing for example the Total Information Awareness system, a data mining 
operation used to detect terrorist activities). 
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 bolster sagging recruitment efforts.34  Besides the concerns of potential improper uses 
by the government, there is also concern that such commercial databases can be used to 
process sensitive information and cause potentially embarrassing or highly personal 
information to float freely from database to database.36  For example, public arrest 
records that are legitimately collected may be passed from one database to another and 
end up illegitimately denying one’s employment or housing.   
The dearth of meaningful legal requirements that such personal data be kept 
securely37 means it can fall into wrong hands that can exploit it for illegal and harmful 
purposes.  For example, consumer profiles can facilitate crimes such as identity theft, 
stalking, or harassment.38  To make matters worse, “uber-databases” can be created, 
composed of non-sensitive information in such enormous quantities that they contain 
detailed dossiers of each individual’s entire existence.39  While there may be legitimate 
uses to these personal dossiers, their existence makes governmental and other illegitimate 
uses more likely and damaging.  
Despite these problems, there is currently no federal legislation that regulates the 
sale of personal data or aggregated profiles.  Instead, federal laws cover specific types of 
personal data in specific contexts.40  Some notable legislation include older privacy laws 
such as Privacy Act of 1974 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.  Both have data 
privacy provisions applicable to the present problem.41  In recent years, for example, 
Congress has enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bailey (GLB) Act of 1999 to mandate opt-out 
                                                
34 Jonathan Krim, Pentagon Creating Student Database, WASH. POST, June 23, 2005, at A1. 
36 Richards, supra note 21, at 1158. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 71. 
41 SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 67-68.  
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 mechanism when corporations share “nonpublic personal information.”42  Congress 
also enacted the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003 to 
strengthen the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s privacy provisions.43 
However, viewed in the expansive space where data can be collected and 
exchanged, these federal laws cover only a small geography of the personal data 
problem.44  Furthermore, these laws address privacy in certain contexts but ignore it in 
others.45  Thus, critics have described the federal government’s response to privacy issues 
as haphazard, mosaic and unsatisfactory.46  
III. The First Amendment Defense and the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
 
Even with their limited coverage, federal data privacy laws have been the subjects 
of free speech litigation when they have been enforced.47  In particular, companies argue 
that the First Amendment48 protects the free collection, use and exchange of personal 
data.  In the late 1990s, both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits examined this First 
Amendment defense for the first time and held that the commercial speech doctrine 
governs the use and sale of personal data.49  However, applying the doctrine in its current 
form to the area of personal data has proven to be problematic.  First, owing to varying 
definitions in the precedents, courts have difficulties categorizing personal data as 
“speech” and “commercial speech.”  Second, the uneven application of the commercial 
                                                
42 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809). 
43 H.R. 2622 (108th Cong, 1st Sess.) (2003). 
44 SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 71. 
45 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress of Frontier for Individual Rights?, 
44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195 (1992).  
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., US West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999); Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).   
48 “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech....” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
49 United Reporting Publishing Corp. v. California Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d 
on other grounds, 528 U.S. 32 (1999); U.S. West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).  
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 speech doctrine and intermediate scrutiny has produced inconsistent results in this area 
of personal data speech.  This section will discuss each of these problems in turn.  
A. Is Personal Data Commercial Speech?  
 
Since not all “speech” receives the same treatment under the First Amendment, 
categorization is an integral part of any First Amendment inquiry.50  Unfortunately, both 
the terms “commercial” and “speech”51 are loaded with multiple meanings and ill-defined 
implications.  In adjudicating data privacy litigation courts will need to first determine 
whether personal data is “speech” in order to decide whether the First Amendment is 
applicable.  If so, courts will need to decide whether such speech is “commercial” to 
apply the appropriate level of protection.  As discussed below, each step of the analysis is 
wrought with difficulties and uncertainties.  
1. Data as “Speech” 
At its core, First Amendment “speech” covers expressions in verbal, written or 
artistic forms.52  In addition, the Court has held that “speech” include many actions such 
as political contributions and wearing of communicative clothing.53  Given the Court’s 
expansive definition of “speech,” numerous data privacy scholars have conceded that 
First Amendment “speech” covers personal data,54 and the early circuit cases involving 
data privacy have so held.55  For example, the Tenth Circuit in U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC56 
                                                
50 See generally, William Van Alstyne, A Graphical Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 
107 (1982) (providing graphical overviews of the different categorization of speech under the First 
Amendment). 
51 See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 
265, 267-268 (1981).   
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 See Richards, supra note 21, at 1179. 
55 U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999); United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. California 
Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998). 
56 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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 held that because the FCC prohibited phone companies (the speakers) from freely using 
and sharing their customers’ personal data and phone records with other parties (the 
audience), it was restricting speech.57 
However, the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning does not go far enough to complete the 
inquiry.  This is because the First Amendment exempts certain “speech” such as 
obscenities, as well as certain special areas such as those governed by securities law and 
attorney-client privilege laws.58  These laws often restrict the use of acquired information 
for purposes other than the original permissible one.59  By analogy, one may argue that 
FCC in the U.S. West can restrict phone companies from collecting customers’ phone 
usage and personal data for one purpose (maintaining their phone services) and use them 
later for different purposes (e.g. for marketing purposes).  The Tenth Circuit’s analysis 
does not indicate whether any such exemption applies.   
On the other hand, some have proposed that personal data be characterized as an 
article of commerce.60  This characterization has some support in Reno v. Condon,61 a 
Supreme Court case involving Congress’ exercise of its Commerce Clause power to 
restrict sale of drivers’ personal data by state Departments of Motor Vehicles.  The Court 
there characterized such personal data as “articles of commerce.”62  This type of 
characterization undoubtedly influences the courts toward categorizing personal data as 
commercial speech. 
2. Personal Data as “Commercial” Speech 
                                                
57 Id. at 1232. 
58 Richards, supra note 21 at 1190.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 1195-1200.  
61 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
62 Id. at 148. 
10 
 Courts also have difficulties justifying the categorization of personal data as 
commercial speech because of the Court’s own murky definition of commercial speech.  
This problem can be traced to the origin of the commercial speech doctrine, which arose 
from cases involving commercial advertising.  In 1975, in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,63 the Court first held that 
commercial speech was within the scope of First Amendment protection.  There, the 
Court struck down a Virginia professional conduct statute that prohibited pharmacists 
from advertising the price of prescription drugs.64  The Court reasoned that a 
communication proposing a sale of a product X at the Y price is within the scope of First 
Amendment protection65 because a free enterprise economy depended on numerous 
private economic decisions, which in turn relied on the free flow of commercial 
information.66  The formulation of proposing a sale of product X at the Y price came to 
known as the “core notion” of commercial speech.67  Then in 1980, the Court in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission68 broadly defined 
commercial speech as any “expression related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience.”69   
In one of the first personal data speech cases, the Ninth Circuit in United 
Reporting Publishing Corp. v. California Highway Patrol70 held that the sale of names 
and addresses of recently arrested individuals by a data publishing company constituted 
                                                
63 425 U.S. 748 (1975). 
64 Id. at 749-50. 
65 Id. at 761. 
66 Id. at 765. 
67 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
68 477 U.S. 557 (1980). 
69 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
70 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
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 “commercial speech.”71  The court there acknowledged that “the precise bounds of the 
category of expression that may be termed commercial speech” are subject to doubt.72  
However, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the lack of precise bounds as the Supreme Court’s 
giving broad discretion to the lower courts.73  The Ninth Circuit thus felt it had the 
discretion to come to its own conclusion.74  
The court reasoned that the data speech in question could be reduced to “I 
[publishing service] will sell you [client] the X [names and addresses of arrestees] at the 
Y price,” and so was a purely economic transaction.75  Therefore it would fit comfortably 
within the narrow definition of commercial speech.  However, this characterization is 
incorrect because it erroneously classified the advertising of the data product as the 
“speech” in question, when the “speech” subject of the regulation was really the arrestees 
data.  The court might have been confused because so much of the commercial speech 
precedents involved advertising.  Because of this error, the categorization of arrestee’s 
personal data as commercial speech would only work under Central Hudson’s broader 
definition of “related solely to the economic interests.”  Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court later reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on standing grounds and did not address 
the commercial speech issue.76  
 A year after United Reporting, the Tenth Circuit decided the aforementioned U.S. 
West77 case.  Like the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit noted that while the use and sale of 
                                                
71 Id. at 1137. 
72 Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
637 (1985)). 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Id.; see Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762.   
76 Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
77 U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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 phone company customer data do not fit neatly into the traditional commercial speech 
definition of “a speech that proposes a commercial transaction,”78 the traditional 
definition does not comprise the “universe of commercial speech.”79  Furthermore, the 
Tenth Circuit admitted there was much ambiguity in the doctrine as to what exactly 
constituted commercial speech.80  Nonetheless the court assumed, without offering any 
justification, that the personal data in question was commercial speech because it was 
speech “integral to and inseparable from the ultimate commercial solicitation.”81  
Due to ambiguity in the commercial speech precedents, it was impossible for the 
Tenth Circuit to forward a good justification for classifying customer phone data as 
commercial speech.  The difficulty of precisely defining “commercial speech” is a 
problem that predated United Reporting and U.S. West.  In 1990, Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski pointed out it was not unclear just what exactly met the 
traditional narrow definition of “proposing a commercial transaction.”82  For example, a 
TV ad could be classified as a very short film, which is a form of speech fully protected 
by the First Amendment.83 
Others have found the Central Hudson’s broader definition of “speech concerning 
solely the economic interests of the speakers and audiences” problematic as well.84  
Examples such as a newspaper article discussing business affairs and an author writing 
                                                
78 Id. at 1222-23 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 433 U.S. 376 (1973)).  
79 Id. at 1233, n.4. 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 638-39 
(1990).  
83 Id. 
84 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to 
Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1081-83 (2000). 
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 product reviews for pay would technically fall under this definition.85  However, such 
speech receives no less protection than political, religious, and social commentary.86  
Hence, it is argued that although personal data is being sold for the “economic interests,” 
it still deserves full First Amendment protection.87  Justice Thomas also noted these 
difficulties in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,88 a case involving regulation 
on news racks on public sidewalks.  He said: “[t]his very case illustrates the difficulty of 
drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.”89   
Despite these difficulties, the Court does not seem ready to abandon the 
commercial speech doctrine.90  In the last twenty-five years, the Court has not abandoned 
the distinction between commercial speech and other types of speech, and only Justice 
Thomas has indicated a willingness to abandon the distinction.91  Therefore, it is unlikely 
that there will be any satisfying solution to the problem of categorizing personal data. 
B. Development of Intermediate Scrutiny for Commercial Speech Regulation 
 
Even if the Court were to construe personal data as commercial speech, there is 
still the problem of applying the appropriate level of constitutional protection.  The 
commercial speech doctrine has undergone major changes in the last several decades, and 
the shifting doctrine will affect any analysis of personal data as commercial speech cases.  
This section will examine how the development of commercial speech doctrine has led to 
difficulties for courts in data speech cases.  
                                                
85 Id. at 1081. 
86 Id.  Volokh also pointed out that recent cases in the late 1990s including 44 Liquormart have moved 
away from the Central Hudson language and toward the common definition of “proposing a commercial 
transaction.”  Id. at 1082, n. 138.  
87 Id. at 1081. 
88 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
89 Id. at 418-20. 
90 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
91 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
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 Until the 1970s the Court afforded no constitutional protection to commercial 
speech.92  In 1980, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission,93 the Court first applied intermediate scrutiny and used a four-part test to 
determine the constitutionality of a commercial speech regulation.94  Now known as the 
Central Hudson test, it provided that courts should determine: (1) whether the 
commercial speech is truthful and not misleading, and if so, (2) whether the asserted 
government interest is substantial, (3) whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and (4) whether the regulation is no more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest.95  
In 1996, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,96 the Court opened the possibility 
that strict scrutiny may be applied to commercial speech.  In unanimously striking down 
a Rhode Island ban on price advertising for alcohol, the Court said Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny is only justified when the state regulates commercial messages to 
protect consumers “from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sale practices.”97  
Otherwise, “strict review” is appropriate.98  The Court proceeded to do so because it did 
not find that the Rhode Island’s total ban of alcohol price information to be motivated by 
a consumer protection interest that justified intermediary scrutiny.99  In particular, the 
majority read the fourth prong of Central Hudson to require an evaluation of a ban’s 
                                                
92 Earl M. Maltz, The Strange Career of Commercial Speech, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 162 (2003). 
93 447 U.S. 557.  The court struck down a state regulation that prohibited electricity companies from 
sending advertisements promoting the electricity use along with utility bills. 
94 Id. at 566.  
95 Id. 
96 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
97 Id. at 501. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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 effectiveness and an examination of alternatives to determine a ban’s 
constitutionality.100  Under the majority’s application of the test, the regulation must be 
“no more extensive than necessary.”101  Furthermore, the majority requires the regulation 
to “directly advance” its purpose “to a material degree” or “significantly.”102 
 Justice O'Connor’s concurrence also appeared to tighten the requirement of the 
last prong of the Central Hudson test by taking “the availability of less burdensome 
alternatives” as a signal that narrow tailoring is not met.103  Furthermore, O’Connor states 
that there was no need for the majority to apply a more strict version of the Central 
Hudson test, since the Rhode Island’s regulation would have failed Central Hudson “as 
is.”104  In sum, 44 Liquormart signaled the Court’s intention to increase protection for 
commercial speech.  Hence, post-44 Liquormart, a government regulation must meet this 
searching examination.  Therefore, it seems unlikely that a regulation banning 
commercial speech would ever survive the Central Hudson test as applied by the 44 
Liquormart court.105  It is not surprising that, since 44 Liquormart, the Court has struck 
down regulations banning casino advertising106 and billboards for tobacco products.107 
1. Intermediate Scrutiny Applied: U.S West 
Post 44 Liquormart, the Tenth Circuit applied the Central Hudson test in the 
aforementioned U.S. West case.  There, the FCC issued an order108 requiring 
telecommunication companies to implement an opt-in procedure before using, disclosing 
                                                
100 Id. at 505. 
101 Id. at 507. 
102 Id. at 505. 
103 Id. at 529. 
104 Id. at 532. 
105 Id.  
106 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
107 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).  
108 The FCC acted under the authority of the Tele-communications Act of 1996. 47 U.S.C. §222(a). 
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 or sharing a customer’s personal information109 for marketing purposes.110  The “opt-
in” procedure required a company to obtain customer consent prior to using or sharing 
the customer’s information.  To the phone companies, this was more restrictive than the 
opposite “opt-out” procedure, which instead allowed a company to use or share 
information until a customer decided to voice disapproval.  The FCC order, however, did 
not prohibit companies from contacting their own customers about the services to which 
they already subscribed.111 
In U.S. West, the first prong of Central Hudson was met because both parties 
agreed that the data involved truthful and non-misleading information.112  The Tenth 
Circuit then devoted substantial discussion on whether a government asserted privacy 
interest could sufficiently meet the second prong of Central Hudson, which required 
substantial state interest.  While the court acknowledged that privacy may rise to the level 
of substantial interest, the court looked for, but did not find, a showing of specific harms 
such as potential for embarrassment or misappropriation of sensitive information.113  
Nevertheless, the court assumed that the FCC had met the second prong,114 because it 
would fail on the last two prongs. 
On the third prong, the court, invoking 44 Liquormart languages, held that the 
FCC failed to prove that the regulation “directly and materially advances its interest.”115  
The court said that the FCC only relied on speculation and did not provide evidence that 
                                                
109 At issue was customer proprietary network information (CPNI), which included information collected 
over the course of the carrier-customer relationship, such as details on telephone bills as well as records of 
phone calls placed and received.  U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1228 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999). 
110 Id. at 1228.   
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 1234. 
113 Id.  The court also observed, “[a] general level of discomfort from knowing that people can readily 
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 privacy interests would be harmed.116  Finally, the court held that the regulation did not 
meet the fourth prong of Central Hudson, which required the regulation to be narrowly 
tailored.  Citing O’Connor’s occurrence in 44 Liquormart, the court noted that “evidence 
of an obvious and substantially less restrictive means” indicated “a lack of narrow 
tailoring.”117  The court reasoned that the opt-out approach advocated by the phone 
companies was less restrictive than the FCC’s mandated opt-in approach, 118 citing 
experimental data presented by the phone companies that only a small percentage of 
customers granted approval to share their data when contacted under the opt-in 
approach.119  The court rejected FCC’s position that opt-out was not as effective as opt-in 
as an argument based only on “common sense” and speculation, which was sufficient 
only to meet a rational basis analysis.120  Hence, the FCC lost under the last two prongs 
of Central Hudson and the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari.121  Undoubtedly, the 
44 Liquormart decision made the case much more difficult for the FCC.  
2. A Novel Approach to Intermediate Scrutiny: Trans Union Corp. v. FTC122  
 
 Two years later after U.S. West was decided, the D.C. Circuit offered a different 
and conflicting rationale for intermediate scrutiny in Trans Union Corp. v. FTC.123  The 
court there upheld a FTC order preventing Trans Union, a credit reporting agency, from 
selling its target marketing products.  The data products consisted of lists of names and 
addresses of individuals who met specific financial criteria, such as possession of an auto 
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121 Competition Policy Inst. v. US West, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2215 (2000). 
122 245 F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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 loan, a department store credit card, or two or more mortgages.124  The FTC acted 
under the authority of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),125 which restricts a credit 
reporting agency to furnish consumer reports to persons for certain “permissible 
purposes” only, some of which include determining eligibility for credit and 
employment.126  The FTC determined that the lists that Trans Union sold to target 
marketers were “credit reports” furnished for an impermissible purpose.127 
 Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit addressed the First Amendment 
argument last in its opinion, devoting only five paragraphs to it.128  Also, instead of 
applying Central Hudson, the D.C. Circuit justified intermediate scrutiny using a 
rationale from Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.129   In Dun & 
Bradstreet, the Court held that a plaintiff did not have to meet the New York Times actual 
malice standard130 when he brought a defamation suit against a consumer reporting 
agency who caused harm by issuing erroneous information about the plaintiff to five 
customers.131 
 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that Dun & Bradstreet stood for the proposition that 
speech that served only private interests deserved reduced constitutional protection.132  
Since Trans Union’s lists were “solely of interest to the company and its business 
customers and relates to no matter of public concern,”133 the lists warranted reduced 
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 constitutional protection.134  Without mentioning Central Hudson,135 the D.C. Circuit 
simply held in two paragraphs that the government had met intermediate scrutiny.136  
 In its denial for rehearing,137 the D.C. Circuit defended its decision to apply Dun 
& Bradstreet.138  The court admitted that Trans Union’s reports did not contain “wholly 
false” information as with those in Dun & Bradstreet, but still dismissed the distinction 
as non-critical.139  Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit discussed a line of cases decided under 
the Central Hudson test.  The court said that the FTC satisfied narrow tailoring required 
by intermediate scrutiny because its action was distinguishable from those actions held to 
be impermissible under various applications of Central Hudson.  The D.C. Circuit 
reasoned that, unlike restrictions on vice advertising (e.g. gambling, alcohol, tobacco), 
where the government sought to mitigate harms caused by the advertised conduct or 
product, the government here could not “promote its interest (protection of personal 
financial data) except by regulating speech because the speech itself cause[d] the very 
harm the government [sought] to prevent.”140  Hence the court implied that the results 
would have been the same even if Central Hudson, as interpreted by 44 Liquormart, had 
been applied, and that it was immaterial that the court arrived at intermediate scrutiny 
from a different rationale.  As such, the D.C. Circuit produced an outcome that is directly 
opposite to that of the Tenth Circuit. 
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 After the denial for rehearing, Trans Union appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which denied the petition for writ of certiorari,141 with Justices Kennedy and O’Connor 
dissenting.  Kennedy hinted that the D.C. Circuit’s rationale was out of the ordinary, and 
perhaps incorrect: “[t]his case is of national importance, and the Court of Appeals has 
adopted a novel approach to commercial speech.  I would grant the petition for 
certiorari.”142  Kennedy also correctly distinguished Dun & Bradstreet as a case 
involving false speech and noted that that it was only a plurality opinion.  This was a 
controversial case that had been criticized, and transplanting its rationale to a truthful 
speech context is problematic.143  In 2003, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to 
clear the confusion when it denied cert in the commercial speech case Nike v. Kasky.144   
IV. Toward a Tiered Approach in Adjudicating First Amendment Challenges to 
Data Privacy Laws 
  
 In light of the problems with these early commercial speech cases involving 
personal data, this article proposes a tiered approach unique to data privacy laws.  The 
proposed approach moves the focus away from the debate over whether personal data is 
“commercial” speech and instead focuses on ensuring effective data privacy laws are 
made consistent with the speech protection goals of the First Amendment.   
There are three reasons why the focus on the debate over whether data is 
“commercial” speech is misplaced.  First, while personal data are sold for commercial 
purposes, there are instances when they are used for non-commercial purposes such as 
charity fund-raising, political organizing, and private or police detective work.  Hence, 
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 personal data cannot fit into an either-or distinction between commercial speech and 
non-commercial speech; it is simply in a different category of its own.  Second, US West 
and United Reporting showed that that courts struggled to categorize personal data as 
commercial speech.  In addition it is clear that the Court is not moving toward a clear, 
bright-line rule approach in commercial speech.145  It is enough to note that in many 
instances personal data is analogous to commercial speech, and this can be a basis for 
supporting intermediate scrutiny for some data privacy regulations.  Third and most 
important, the commercial attribute of personal data is secondary to the primary concern 
of control.  Unlike restriction on political speech or dangerous speech, regulation of 
personal data is not about suppressing ideas, as personal data is neutral and contains no 
opinion or idea.  The main issue is the control of data -- who gets to use it and how.  It is 
more useful to emphasize the aspect of personal data as property or goods.  Based on 
these concepts of data control and data as property, this article proposes a three-tier 
approach to evaluating the constitutionality of data privacy laws under the commercial 
speech precedents.  This tiered approach is somewhat similar to the Court’s Time, Place 
and Manner jurisprudence, which varies the level of constitutional protection based on 
the regulation scheme in question. 
A. Top Tier: Strict Scrutiny for Categorical Bans 
At the top tier, regulation that bans use or sale of personal data in a categorical 
way should receive something akin to strict scrutiny in line with the approach taken by 
the Court in 44 Liquormart.  Just as it is difficult to justify a total ban on alcohol price 
information to serve a public health purpose, government should not be able to ban any 
data speech, commercial or otherwise, for privacy purposes unless it meets strict scrutiny.  
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 Justices Stevens and Kennedy’s dissent in United Reporting pointed out that were 
United Reporting to lawfully obtain arrestees’ data from a legal source other than the 
state government, California could not have banned United Reporting from using the data 
for commercial purposes.146  Even though bans by category may be the most effective 
means of privacy regulation, they completely wrestle away control of data from its owner 
and heighten the risk of laws running contrary to the principle of free speech.     
B. Second Tier: Intermediate Scrutiny for Regulation Requiring Consent  
 
The second tier of the proposed approach distinguishes regulations that ban 
speech from those that burden speech.  When the government is burdening the exchange 
of personal data to address the data control issue, intermediate scrutiny should apply.  
Regulation requiring an opt-in falls within this category.  Indeed, this approach should be 
favored because it puts in place a default position in the law that addresses an imbalance 
of bargaining power between corporations and individuals.  The opt-in requirement is 
similar to default contractual provisions that provide that there should be no free use of 
data unless the parties have a “meeting of the minds.”  For example, users of free email 
websites often give up personal information to companies and allow them to share the 
information, all in exchange for email services.  This exchange is an “opt-in” in action 
and fits with the data as property paradigm because personal data is given in exchange for 
a benefit.   
Requiring opt-in fits with the control paradigm since it requires individuals to 
decide when and where to relinquish control of their personal information.  Practically 
speaking, companies that already have data would be required to obtain consent before 
using and selling it.  This would go a long way in addressing the privacy problems noted 
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 in Part II.  No longer will websites indiscriminately sell data without first getting 
consent.  In addition, if intermediate scrutiny is met, laws should be able to require a 
default of limited scope consent, so that data are not passed from place from place 
without explicit consent. 
It is true that the “opt-in” default position economically burdens companies, as do 
regulations that require companies to securely store data.  However, regulations that 
burden data speech are beneficial because they correct the current devaluing of personal 
data.  Opt-in makes “post-consent” personal data valuable again and deters it from being 
passed carelessly from one place to another.  Regulation requiring secure storage also 
will achieve the same effect.  If personal data becomes expensive, companies will make 
more effort to guard it.  
Viewed in this way, the U.S. West decision was too harsh in striking down the 
FCC order.  The Tenth Circuit took notice of O’Connor’s 44 Liquormart concurrence, 
which stated that, even under Central Hudson, the availability of a less restrictive 
alternative is evidence that a law fails narrow tailoring.147  The Tenth Circuit gave only 
this justification: the existence of opt-out was an indication that opt-in was not a least 
restrictive means,148 which meant that the Tenth Circuit was essentially applying a least 
restrictive means analysis.  Yet the Tenth Circuit failed to take into account that both opt-
in and opt-out are distinguishable from the type of total ban that triggered strict scrutiny 
in 44 Liquormart.  This distinction is taken into account in the tiered approach.  
Another argument for less than strict scrutiny in this area is that 44 Liquormart 
justified striking down bans on advertisement by reasoning that narrow tailoring requires 
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 the government to pursue its interests by directly regulating the harmful conduct or 
product promoted by the advertisement.149  On this point, the D.C. Circuit was correct in 
Trans Union.  It follows that, if personal data sold in aggregated form without consent is 
the “actual” harmful product, then government regulation on the data “product” is exactly 
the action that the Court requires.  Indeed, language in 44 Liquormart seems to allow 
more leeway when government acts in a consumer protection interest.150   
 Finally, data privacy is an inherently architectural problem that requires an 
architectural solution.151  For example, the national Do-Not-Call registry, upheld by the 
Tenth Circuit in 2004,152 provided the type of architectural solution that ordinary 
customers needed to protect their privacy.  There, the FCC and FTC provided a tool to 
help consumers opt-out of telemarketing lists in one national centralized database.  The 
Tenth Circuit, characterizing the Do-Not-Call list as an “opt-in program” that put the 
choice of whether or not to restrict commercial calls entirely in the hands of the 
individuals, upheld the regulation.153  The Do-Not-Call registry example suggests that 
there is a way in which the government can create a technological solution that allows 
individual consumers to opt-out/opt-in more easily.  This will help the many consumers 
who are either unaware of privacy concerns or do not have enough savvy to protect their 
privacy, again putting control of data back where it belongs.154 
C. The Special Tier: “Data Defamation” Torts 
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  Finally, at the third tier is a different type of test altogether, one that would 
follow the Court’s treatment of defamation torts under the First Amendment.  Covered in 
this tier are statutes that have private rights of action provisions against companies that 
violate privacy laws.  Much like the way that defamation actions are treated differently 
under the First Amendment, these provisions should also receive a special formulation of 
scrutiny, since they are analogous to torts laws.  Part of the Trans Union opinion 
undoubtedly took this factor into consideration because the FRCA provided for private 
right of action against Trans Union for violating the FRCA.155  
This is an evolving area of law, because unlike defamation, privacy harms often 
involve truthful speech.  The law is not ready to abandon this historical distinction of true 
versus false speech, even though with regard to privacy true speech often causes more 
damages.  For example, fake or incorrect social security numbers and personal 
information are of no use to identity thieves, or telemarketers.  This is another area where 
personal data’s unique attributes make it a misfit under the traditional notions of the First 
Amendment.  
Moreover, individuals often suffer privacy harm inherent in the aggregation of 
truthful personal information.  This area remains unsettled because of rapid technological 
changes as well as shifting policy debates.156  The technological possibility for pervasive 
harms from truthful data remains not yet fully recognized by the public in the present.  If 
and when the harm caused by truthful personal data is recognized as equal to those of 
false speech that gives rise to traditional torts actions, Congress or state legislative bodies 
should be able to codify such harms into statutes.  The First Amendment should have a 
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 place for such “data torts” along side of defamation torts.  Indeed, if one accepts this 
argument, then the D.C. Circuit’s analogy between the harm in the truthful credit report 
and that of defamation does not seem so far-fetched. 
Conceptually, consumer statutes that allow for private rights of action also helps 
solve the architectural problem of unequal balancing power in a way similar to the Do-
Not-Call registry.  These consumer protection statutes provide individuals with tools to 
take back some control of their own data through litigation.  Indeed, individuals are 
already starting to file suits under state consumer protection laws to protect their data 
privacy.  The first example is Leadbetter v. Comcast Cable Communications,157 a class 
action suit where cable internet users are suing cable providers over the release of their 
information for investigation into illegal music downloading.  In another case, an 
America Online (AOL) subscriber sued AOL for giving away his information in response 
to a simple police request.158  The First Amendment should not unduly restrict these 
consumers from pursuing their private rights of action to protect data privacy.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Privacy regulations over the use and sale of personal data face constitutional 
uncertainty.  As the commercial speech doctrine continues to govern this area, the 
Court’s vague formulation of what triggers intermediate scrutiny versus strict scrutiny 
leaves both opportunities and challenges for regulatory agencies like the FTC and the 
FCC.  The focus on whether personal data constitutes commercial speech is misplaced, 
and a new category for personal data is needed to allow the courts to better account for 
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 the distinctive attributes of personal data.  Finally, such a new category of data speech 
can adapt from precedents from the commercial speech area, and the Court should 
distinguish total bans from other regulatory regimes to accomplish the goals of 
encouraging effective privacy laws while protecting speech rights.  In this manner, the 
Court will ensure that the commercial speech doctrine as applied to personal data will 
accord proper weight to the increasingly important interests of data privacy.   
